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authorLudovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>2025-06-21 10:49:28 +0200
committerJohn Kehayias <john.kehayias@protonmail.com>2025-06-24 11:53:31 -0400
commitfbdf9d4ba99115c3cd0ef38919c0c67976ee76aa (patch)
treea0fb688e82905ff9880bc4a2117768108ad5861c
parent30a5d140aa5a789a362749d057754783fea83dde (diff)
news: Add entry for ‘guix-daemon’ vulnerability fix.
* etc/news.scm: Add entry. Change-Id: I7f143c268070a6fbcc1a343374ee4443add60bc2 Signed-off-by: John Kehayias <john.kehayias@protonmail.com>
-rw-r--r--etc/news.scm33
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/etc/news.scm b/etc/news.scm
index e190682382..7901aab390 100644
--- a/etc/news.scm
+++ b/etc/news.scm
@@ -38,6 +38,39 @@
(channel-news
(version 0)
+
+ (entry (commit "30a5d140aa5a789a362749d057754783fea83dde")
+ (title
+ (en "@command{guix-daemon} privilege escalation vulnerabilities
+fixed (CVE-2025-46415, CVE-2025-46416)"))
+ (body
+ (en "Vulnerabilities in the build daemon, @command{guix-daemon}, were
+identified and fixed. One vulnerability would allow any user on the system
+that can interact with the daemon to potentially corrupt new packages built
+locally (CVE-2025-46416). With the other vulnerability (CVE-2025-46415), if
+@command{guix-daemon} is running as root, it is also possible to escalate to
+root privileges. CVE-2025-52991, CVE-2025-52992, and CVE-2025-52993 were
+identified as additional opportunities that could have prevented the proposed
+exploits.
+
+Everyone is strongly advised to upgrade @command{guix-daemon}. Guix System
+users can do this with commands along these lines:
+
+@example
+sudo guix system reconfigure /run/current-system/configuration.scm
+sudo herd restart guix-daemon
+@end example
+
+If you are using Guix on another distro, run @command{info \"(guix) Upgrading
+Guix\"} or visit
+@uref{https://guix.gnu.org/manual/devel/en/html_node/Upgrading-Guix.html} to
+learn how to upgrade Guix.
+
+The root cause of the vulnerability was the ability of a @dfn{fixed-output
+derivation} build process to smuggle a file descriptor to the store or to a
+setuid program to an outside process @i{via} an abstract Unix-domain socket.
+See @uref{https://codeberg.org/guix/guix/pulls/788} for more information.")))
+
(entry (commit "78d4b1e52c731502b29288ab6975bd9efa91392a")
(title
(en "New services for /etc/profile.d and /etc/bashrc.d")